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Family firms are often portrayed as an important yet conservative form of organization
that is reluctant to invest in innovation; however, simultaneously, evidence has shown
that family firms are flourishing and in fact constitute many of the world’s most in-
novative firms. Our study contributes to disentangling this puzzling effect. We argue that
family firms—owing to the family’s high level of control over the firm, wealth concen-
tration, and importance of nonfinancial goals—invest less in innovation but have an
increased conversion rate of innovation input into output and, ultimately, a higher in-
novation output than nonfamily firms. Empirical evidence from a meta-analysis based
on 108 primary studies from 42 countries supports our hypotheses. We further argue
and empirically show that the observed effects are even stronger when the CEO of the
family firm is a later-generation family member. However, when the CEO of the family
firm is the firm’s founder, innovation input is higher and, contrary to our initial ex-
pectations, innovation output is lower than that in other firms. We further show that the
family firm–innovation input–output relationships depend on country-level factors;
namely, the level of minority shareholder protection and the education level of the
workforce in the country.
Family firms have often been portrayed as tradi-
tional firms that shy away from seeking new oppor-
tunities, that follow conservative strategies, and that
ultimately are less innovative than other types of or-
ganizations (Economist, 2009). At the same time,
however, evidence has revealed thatmore than half of
the most innovative large European firms are con-
trolled by family owners (http://www.forbes.com/
innovative-companies/list/). Moreover, the “German
Mittelstand,” which consists of a large number of
rather resource-constrained family firms (Fiss &Zajac,
2004), holds a large number of innovative “hidden
champions” thatalsohappentobeinnovationleaders in
their specificmarkets (Simon,1996).Sinceroughly two-
thirds of all firms and one third of all publically listed
firms worldwide can be considered family firms, and
since those firms, in turn, contribute substantially to the
majority of jobs and GDP on a global base (http://www.
ffi.org/?page5GlobalDataPoints), family firms can be
considered an omnipresent and important organiza-
tional form of economies worldwide (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). As such, an advanced
understanding of their innovation behavior is pressing.
Recent scholarly inquiries have started to illu-
minate the paradox of family firm innovation, but
have reported inconclusive findings thus far. While
some studies have provided empirical evidence for
negative associations between family firms and in-
novation (Block, 2012; Chen &Hsu, 2009; Chrisman
& Patel, 2012; Munari, Oriani, & Sobrero, 2010),
others have found positive effects (Gudmundson,
Tower, & Hartman, 2003; Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008;
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Llach & Nordqvist, 2010). Moreover, from a theo-
retical perspective, previously applied theories fall
short of comprehensively explaining the observed
patterns of family firm innovation. For instance,
prior applications of behavioral agency theory to
family firm innovation (Chrisman & Patel, 2012)
have suggested that family firms typically under-
invest in research and development (R&D), but
cannot explain the large number of innovative
family firms, as mentioned above. The resource-
based view (Barney, 1991), by contrast, explains
several resource orchestration advantages of family
firms (Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011) but
fails to predict family firms’ low level of investment
in innovation.
To disentangle these puzzling effects, we first
propose that family firmsaredistinct fromnonfamily
firms with regard to the families’ high levels of con-
trol over the firm, family wealth concentration, and
the importance of nonfinancial goals in those firms.
We then continue to theorize that those three idio-
syncrasies lead to lower innovation input in family
firms, but, at the same time, increase the conversion
rate of innovation input into innovation output, ul-
timately resulting in higher levels of innovation
output in family firms as compared to other forms of
organizations. More specifically, the idiosyncrasies
of family firms imply lower innovation input, de-
fined as a firm’s innovation-related financial in-
vestments (Ahuja,Lampert,&Tandon,2008), because
such firms, relative to their nonfamily counterparts,
face a limited availability of financial resources to be
invested into innovation and because they hold
a preference for investments characterized by low
levels of uncertainty. Besides those influences of the
family firm idiosyncrasies on the decision making
and resource allocation within the organization, we
also expect family firm idiosyncrasies to fundamen-
tally render the conversion process of innovation
input into output more efficient, as they imply the
use of specific monitoring mechanisms and lead to
the development of capabilities that are valuable for
innovation. In particular, we emphasize resource
orchestration (Sirmon et al., 2011), such as the de-
ployment of valuable, firm-specific tacit knowledge
and superior access to feedback from a trusted, ex-
ternal network. As a consequence of this efficient
conversion process, family firms are characterized
ultimatelybyhigh levelsof innovationoutput, suchas
new product launches (Adams, Bessant, & Phelps,
2006).
However, family firms are not a homogeneous
group (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012). In
particular, the behavior of family firms with a fam-
ily member as CEO has been shown to differ from
that of family firms with an external CEO (Miller,
Le Breton‐Miller, Minichilli, Corbetta, & Pittino,
2014), for instance, because of the different goals
that those CEOs pursue. The notion that the CEO
matters for family firm innovation resonates with in-
novation research that has long emphasized the im-
portant role of leadership (Alexiev, Jansen, Van den
Bosch, & Volberda, 2010; Crossan & Apaydin, 2010;
Mumford & Licuanan, 2004; Vaccaro, Jansen, Van
Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2012): Firm leaders, and in
particular CEOs (Jung, Chow, & Wu, 2003), not only
have substantial say in resource-allocation decisions
(Hambrick&Mason,1984) butalsomonitor anddirect
the usage of those resources. CEOs encourage, select,
and nurture innovation activities that emerge within
the firm (Burgelman, 1991; West, Borrill, Dawson,
Brodbeck, Shapiro,&Haward, 2003), and they“create
conditions for the subsequent implementation of in-
novation” (Crossan & Apaydin, 2010: 1170). We thus
study how the aforementioned relationships between
family firms and innovation input–output change if
the CEO is a familymember. To do so, we distinguish
between two types of CEOs who are family members,
since prior research has revealed substantial differ-
ences among these two categories of leaders (Miller,
Le Breton‐Miller, & Lester, 2011): (a) nonfounder
family-memberCEOs (henceforth, “familyCEO”) and
(b) founder CEOs. First, we argue that the above-
mentioned effects of family firm status on innovation
input and output are strengthened if the CEO is
a family CEO. In other words, family firms with
a family CEO invest even less in innovation but have
even higher innovation output owing to an increased
conversion rate. Second, we argue that family firms
with a founder CEO, mainly because of their idio-
syncratic investment preferences, have higher in-
novation input. In line with the argumentation for
family CEOs, we further expect that family firmswith
founder CEOs have higher innovation output.
To test our hypotheses, we conduct a meta-
analysis based on 108 primary studies that focus on
42 countries for the period from 1981 to 2012. Meta-
analytic techniques are particularly appropriate for
this purpose because the body of existing data from
a multitude of studies regarding family firm in-
novation is likely to provide deeper and more fine-
grained insights into our phenomenon compared to
any single data set. Moreover, advanced meta-
analytic techniques have been shown to be power-
ful tools for extending theory (Bergh et al., 2014;
Combs, Ketchen, Crook, & Roth, 2011). Specifically,
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we apply meta-analytic structural equation model-
ing (MASEM) to test the six abovementioned hy-
potheses. In a post hoc test based on meta-analytic
regression analysis (MARA), we further reveal in-
sights into how the hypothesized relationships be-
tween family firms and innovation input and output
depend on country-level institutional factors.
Our study aims to make several contributions to
the innovation literature. Research on innovation
has long sought to understand the determinants of
innovation in organizations (Damanpour, 1991;
Schumpeter, 1934). While past research has studied
an abundance of institution-, industry-, and firm-
level drivers of innovation (see Ahuja et al., 2008 for
a summary), the role of a firm’s governance constel-
lation (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002;
Zhang, Zhang, & Zhao, 2003), and in particular
family control (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Go´mez-
Mejı´a, Campbell, Martin, Hoskisson, Makri, &
Sirmon, 2014; Patel & Chrisman, 2014), have been
only scarcely addressed so far (DeMassis, Frattini, &
Lichtenthaler, 2013). Incorporating the effect of
family control into innovation studies is important
for general management researchers, since the
family firm is one of the most predominant organi-
zational forms around the world (La Porta et al.,
1999). We further advance the innovation literature
not only by highlighting the importance of family
control as a determinant of firm-level innovation,
but also by pointing to the different effects that
family control exerts on innovation input and out-
put. Specifically, we identify family control as one
of the scarcely understood determinants (Ahuja
et al., 2008) that affect innovation input and output
in opposite ways. Since we theorize and provide
empirical evidence that family firms are particu-
larly suited to convert innovation input into in-
novation output, our findings may also inform
nonfamily firms striving to increase the efficiency of
their innovation processes.
Moreover, our paper has strong implications for
the growing body of literature on innovation in
family firms. First, we disentangle innovation input
and output to reconcile the conflicting views about
family firm innovativeness. By building on three
distinct characteristics of family firms—namely,
family owners’ high level of control over the firm,
wealth concentration, and importance of nonfinancial
goals—we show that family control undermines in-
novation input but that these very same attributes
translate into superior innovation output. We thus
provideamorecomprehensive andnuancedpictureof
family firm innovation.
In addition, findings from our meta-analysis in-
form the scholarly debate on the heterogeneity of
family- and founder-led firms (Chua et al., 2012). In
particular, we contribute to the conversation re-
garding whether family firms should strive for
increased management professionalization (Go´mez-
Mejı´a, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003; Stewart &
Hitt, 2012) and whether founder involvement is
a blessing or a curse for important firm outcomes
(Jayaraman, Khorana, Nelling, & Covin, 2000; Miller
et al., 2011). Specifically, we argue and empirically
show that innovation output is even stronger when
a family CEO is at the helm of the company. In-
terestingly, innovation output is lower when the
founder is still active as the CEO of the company,
even though such firms typically have higher in-
vestment in innovation.
Lastly, our findings also contribute to the un-
derstanding of innovation from an institution-based
view (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009; Peng,
Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Van Essen, Heugens, Otten, &
Van Oosterhout, 2012) since, in a post hoc test, we
show that two important country-level factors—the
level of minority shareholder protection and the ed-
ucation level of the workforce—moderate the hy-
pothesized relationships between family firms and
innovation input and output.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Innovation Input and Innovation Output
Since Schumpeter’s seminal work (1934), man-
agement research has focused on understanding
the innovation behavior of organizations (for a re-
view, see Ahuja et al., 2008). The constant renewal
of products and processes is thereby associated
with sustainable competitive advantages (D’Aveni,
Dagnino, & Smith, 2010; Garud & Kumaraswamy,
1995; Garud, Tuertscher, & Van de Ven, 2013) and, ul-
timately, superior financialperformance(Andriopoulos
& Lewis, 2009; Calantone, Cavusgil, & Zhao, 2002;
Klomp & Van Leeuwen, 2001). In particular, in today’s
hypercompetitive industries with shortened product
life cycles, innovation has been considered one of
the most important competitive advantages for firms
(Cardinal, 2001; Dess & Picken, 2000; Tushman &
O’Reilly, 1996).
When studying firm-level innovation, researchers
have distinguished between two key concepts—
innovation input and innovation output (Adams
et al., 2006). Innovation input is often defined and
measured as a firm’s financial investment that is
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dedicated toward the exploration and exploitation
of new opportunities. In an often lengthy and com-
plex innovation process (Cooper & Kleinschmidt,
1987; Garud et al., 2013), innovation input is
transformed into innovation output—in the form of,
for instance, patented knowledge or newly de-
veloped products (Schmiedeberg, 2008), which can
ultimately lead to superior firm performance
(Bitard, Edquist, Hommen, & Rickne, 2008; Kemp,
Folkeringa, De Jong, & Wubben, 2003).
While most researchers have assumed that a posi-
tive correlation exists between innovation input and
innovation output (Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Dosi,
1982), the “slope” of this relationship is likely to
differ among organizations because of the complex-
ity of innovation management (Klein & Sorra, 1996;
Mudambi & Swift, 2011; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007;
Yayavaram & Chen, 2015). In other words, organi-
zations are likely to differ in their conversion rate—
that is, in how efficiently they transform innovation
input into innovation output.
To master the challenges associated with effi-
ciently converting innovation input into innovation
output, firms need to possess dynamic capabilities
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen,
1997; Zollo &Winter, 2002); in particular, they need
to excel in “resource orchestration” (Sirmon et al.,
2011) because “resources alone are not likely to
produce a sustainable competitive advantage [, . . .
yet those] resources must be managed appropriately
toproducevalue” (Sirmon&Hitt, 2003: 341). In other
words, inefficient allocation and utilization of R&D
resources (Hitt, Hoskisson, Ireland, & Harrison,
1991; Jensen, 2002)—caused, for instance, by orga-
nizational practices and routines that impede in-
novation (Henderson & Clark, 1990), inadequate
managerial incentive systems, or internal control
system failures (Hitt et al., 1991)—can lead to a low
conversion rate of innovation input into innovation
output. For example, Gilbert (2005) illustrated that
massive investments into new technologies do not
necessarily result in superior products and services
if, for instance, routines are not properly adapted.
Given the importance of innovation, it is not sur-
prising that scholars have long sought to understand
its drivers (e.g., seeBecheikh, Landry, &Amara, 2006
for a review). For instance, researchers have argued
that an organization’s level of innovation is sub-
stantially influenced not only by the size of the
company, as proposed by Schumpeter (1934), but
also by the firm’s network (Chesbrough, 2003;
Dahlander & Gann, 2010), particularly its interac-
tionswith consumers (VonHippel, 2005), and by the
degree to which the firm is able to internalize and
harvest external knowledge (absorptive capacity;
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, &
Volberda, 2005; Zahra & George, 2002). While
scholarly interest in the impact of owners on firm
innovation has recently increased (Hoskisson et al.,
2002), the role of family firms remains largely am-
biguous within this debate so far.
Family Firms
Although exact numbers for the prevalence of
family firms vary, research has consistently shown
that family firms dominate economies around the
world (La Porta et al., 1999). In the United States, for
instance, 40% of all publicly listed firms are family
firms (Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Family firms are
organizations that are characterized by the exis-
tence of individuals, related by family ties, who
exert substantial influence on the company, for ex-
ample, via ownership stakes or important manage-
ment positions held by family members (Ko¨nig,
Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013).1
While family firms are heterogeneous (Chua et al.,
2012), for instance,with regard to the extent towhich
the family and business system overlap (Habbershon
& Williams, 1999), the literature seems to converge
on the idea that family firms are characterized by the
following three idiosyncrasies that render them dis-
tinct from other forms of organizations. First, family
owners’ substantial control over the firm—typically
realized through voting rights—endows them with
particular authority structures and incentives for
monitoring managers and influencing processes
within the organization (Carney, 2005; Gedajlovic &
Carney, 2010; Gedajlovic, Lubatkin, & Schulze,
2004). Second, a large share of family firm owners’
wealth is often invested into one firm, in an undi-
versified manner (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003).
This wealth concentration increases owners’ sensi-
tivity to uncertainty and affects their firms’ in-
vestment preferences, which thus differ from those
1 Prior research has found that more than 30 definitions
have been used in recent publications (O’Boyle, Pollack, &
Rutherford, 2012). In the remainder of this paper, wewill fol-
low recent research (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Go´mez–Mejı´a
et al., 2007; Ko¨nig et al., 2013) and assume that family firms
are those characterized by high levels of family control, re-
alized, for instance, through voting rights, managerial in-
volvement, or family values and culture. In our empirical
analysis, we control for different definitions of family firms
that are used in the analyzed studies.
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of other forms of organizations (Anderson et al.,
2003; Go´mez-Mejı´a, Taka´cs-Haynes, Nu´nez-Nickel,
Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). Third and
lastly, their high level of control over the firm and
the often long shared history between the family
and the firm leads to socioemotional endowments
(Berrone, Cruz, Go´mez-Mejı´a, & Larraza-Kintana,
2010; Go´mez-Mejı´a et al., 2007) and directs atten-
tion not only to financial but also nonfinancial
goals, most importantly the continuation of family
influence and the perseverance of long-established
ties both within and outside the firm (Cruz, Go´mez-
Mejı´a, & Becerra, 2010; Zellweger, Kellermanns,
Chrisman, & Chua, 2012), which might ultimately
affect organizational aspects, such as the firm’s
culture, the available routines and capabilities, and
the firm’s network. Because of these idiosyncrasies,
family firms have been shown to differ from other
firms in organizational behavior such as diversi-
fication (Go´mez-Mejı´a, Makri, & Larraza-Kintana,
2010), internationalization (Zahra, 2003), and
investment policies, particularly with respect to
investment time horizons (Anderson, Duru, &
Reeb, 2012). In the following, we will build on
these three idiosyncrasies of family firms to de-
duce hypotheses on the family firm–innovation
input and output relationships.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES
Baseline Hypotheses: Family Firms and Innovation
Input and Output
Family firms and innovation input. Building on
the abovementioned idiosyncrasies of family firms
and the extant literature, we put forth two main
reasons to expect that family firms, on average, have
lower innovation input compared to other types of
organizations. First, family firm owners’ wealth is
often concentrated2 in one or a few firms (Anderson
et al., 2003). This wealth concentration renders fam-
ily firm owners sensitive to the uncertainty in-
herent in their investments (Bianco, Bontempi,
Golinelli, & Parigi, 2013) and, consequently, incen-
tivizes them to suspend investments in uncertain
projects (cf. McGrath, 1997; Miller & Folta, 2002).
Since innovation projects are a priori uncertain
(Kline & Rosenberg, 1986), for instance with regard
to the timing and degree of technological and mar-
ket success, family firm owners are expected to be
unwilling to invest a substantial amount of re-
sources into innovation. Instead, family firms tend
to prefer investments in less uncertain assets, such
as buildings and production machineries (Anderson
et al., 2012), which render cash flows more predict-
able and allow for more stability—for instance, in
dividend payments—relative to innovation projects
(Miller et al., 2011).
Second, investment in innovation in family firms
is often limited by family firm owners’ socioemo-
tional endowments and particularly by their non-
financial goal to maintain their level of control
over the firm (Go´mez-Mejı´a et al., 2014; Sharma,
Chrisman, & Gersick, 2012).3 Depending on the
industry and country, firms’ average level of in-
vestment in innovation can exceed 10% of firm
revenues (European Commission, 2013); therefore,
innovation input that matches or exceeds the av-
erage input in the particular industry and country
often cannot be financed internally, requiring exter-
nal capital. Family firms, however, are known to be
unwilling to increase theirdebt level or to raisemoney
from the stockmarket (Mishra &McConaughy, 1999).
The underlying reason for such unwillingness is that
family firm owners are reluctant to relinquish control
over the firm—for instance, to external investors—
since this would put their socioemotional wealth at
risk (Go´mez-Mejı´a et al., 2007). Consequently, their
focus on the nonfinancial goal to maintain control
renders family firms’ innovation input limited per se
(Ko¨nig et al., 2013).
On the basis of this discussion, we propose that
while their relative independence from short-term-
orientedmarkets (Graham,Harvey,&Rajgopal, 2005;
Zellweger, 2007) would in principle allow family
firms to take a long-term perspective and to make
substantial investments in innovation, family firm
owners’ sensitivity to uncertainty and their non-
financial desire to maintain control over the firm
2 This concentration of wealth (as opposed to diversifi-
cation) often stems from family firmowners’desire to exert
substantial control over “their” firms. Since control over
a firm typically requires a substantial amount of ownership
stakes in a firm, family firm owners have to select one or
few firms in which to invest the majority of their family’s
wealth.
3 We do not expect any overall effect of family owners’
goal to maintain relationships on innovation input. Such
a nonfinancial goal might affect the distribution of in-
novation input to either exploratory (I_explore) or ex-
ploitative projects (I_exploit), but there is no reason to
expect a significant effect on the amount of innovation
input (I_total), which constitutes the sum of I_explore and
I_exploit (see also discussion in Ko¨nig et al., 2013:
430–431).
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prevents them fromdoing so.Moreover, their unique
power position allows family owners to readily en-
force such investment preferences within the firm.
Thus, we propose:
Hypothesis 1a. Family firms have lower in-
novation input compared to nonfamily firms.
Family firms and innovation output. Family firm
owners’ sensitivity to uncertainty and their re-
luctance to relinquish control not only affect their
firms’ innovation input, but are also likely to de-
termine their firms’ orchestration of resources
(Carnes & Ireland, 2013) and thus how family firms
convert innovation input into output, and, ulti-
mately, their level of innovation output. We posit
that family firms are particularly suited to efficiently
converting innovation input into output. In other
words, we expect that the lower innovation input in
family firms does not transform into lower in-
novation output, for the following reasons.
At the outset, we suggest that family firm owners,
owing to their high level of control, their wealth
concentration, and their reluctance to relinquish
control, are particularly willing and able to monitor
the innovation process (cf. Fama & Jensen, 1983). As
the innovation literature has revealed, one major
source of inefficiency during the innovation process
stems from managerial activities that are not ben-
eficial to the outcome of the innovation process
(Roberts & Fusfeld, 1981). For instance, managers
can support their pet projects (Nohria &Gulati, 1996)
while denying support for other, more promising
projects; political turmoil among middle managers
can delay the implementation of innovation projects
(Kanter, 1983; Shane, Venkataraman, & MacMillan,
1995); and lavish use of the granted resources can
introduce substantial inefficiencies into the process
(Mudambi & Swift, 2011). Such inefficiencies are
commonly facilitated by the limited amount of in-
formation that (nonfamily) firm owners possess
about the promise of specific innovation projects
and their inability to closely monitor and influence
the innovation process (Simester & Zhang, 2010).
Because of their high level of control, family firms
are well suited to overcoming these issues and en-
suring efficient transformation of innovation input
into output, since family owners have superior
power to implicitly and explicitly monitor managers
(Uhlaner, 2013) and can act as “sophisticated in-
vestors” (Bushee, 1998). Moreover, their desire to
avoid uncertainty and their reluctance to take on
external money further motivates family firms to
ensure an efficient or “parsimonious” (Carney, 2005)
conversion of innovation input into innovation
output.
In addition, we propose that the family owners’
high level of control and their attention to non-
financial goals lead to the development of specific
resources and capabilities that foster the innovation
process. Family firms have been shown to pursue
nonfinancial goals such as creating and maintaining
trust-based, long-term relationships with both firm-
internal and external stakeholders (Berrone, Cruz, &
Go´mez-Mejı´a, 2012). We argue that pursuing such
nonfinancial goals, over time, goes along with the
development of a firm-level network, firm-internal
human capital, and routines that are beneficial for
the conversion of innovation input into output.
Specifically, we posit that family firms benefit from
privileged network access that fosters their in-
novationprocesses. An abundant body of innovation
literaturehas emphasized the role of a firm’s network
within the innovation process since “networks can
provide access to knowledge and resources that
are not readily available via market exchanges”
(Rothaermel & Hess, 2007: 901). More specifically,
network partners can propose novel and interesting
ideas (Gassmann, Enkel, & Chesbrough, 2010); they
can provide valuable feedback throughout the in-
novation process (Garud et al., 2013; Tyre & Von
Hippel, 1997), for instance, through early and fre-
quent interaction in the development and testing of
prototypes (Thomke, 2003); and they can support the
marketing of newly developed products (Schreier &
Pru¨gl, 2008).4 We posit that family firms have privi-
leged network access, as family firm owners’ non-
financial goals direct the attention of family firms to
building up and maintaining long-term and trust-
based relationships with external stakeholders such
as suppliers (Berrone et al., 2012; Berrone et al.,
2010), particularly those that are also family firms
(Lester & Cannella, 2006), and loyal customers
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Given the long-
term, trust-based nature of those ties (Pearson, Carr,
& Shaw, 2008), family firms are particularly likely to
receive valuable support from their network partners
(cf. Phelps, 2010), and are also likely to pay attention
4 In other words, while there is still a vivid debate in the
innovation literature on the nuanced effects of, for in-
stance, network closure (Rost, 2011), diversity, anddensity
(Phelps, 2010) on firm innovation, we can conclude that
access to valuable resources from network partners can
foster the innovation process because innovation pro-
cesses are “relational as they involve a diverse set of social
actors” (Garud et al., 2013: 776).
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to, and ultimately implement, the suggestions of
those selected and trusted sources (cf. Piezunka &
Dahlander, 2015). In summary, their focus on ties to
external stakeholders, above and beyond economic
(short-term) transactions, embeds family firms in
a trust-based network (Uzzi, 1997) and endows
them with a superior ability to leverage external
networks,whichhas been labeled amanifestation of
dynamic capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;
Teece et al., 1997).
We further argue that the focus of family firm
owners on nonfinancial goals leads to particularly
high levels of human capital and beneficial intra-
organizational processes and systems that will fur-
ther support the innovation process in family firms.5
Family firmowners’ goal to buildup long-term, trust-
based relationships also extends to firm-internal
stakeholders (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). In-
deed, the community of family firm employees has
been labeled a “pseudo-family” (Ko¨nig et al., 2013;
Tan & Fock, 2001), and tenures appear to be sub-
stantially longer in family firms compared to in
nonfamily firms (Lansberg, 1999), leading to high
levels of experience and deep task-, product-, and
market-specific knowledge among the employees.
This attribute of family firms is likely to play an im-
portant role in the innovationprocess, since “a firm’s
innovative performance is at least partially a func-
tion of the value of its human capital” (Rothaermel &
Hess, 2007: 899).High levels of humancapitalwithin
a firm are beneficial within the innovation process
(Acs & Audretsch, 1988; Hadjimanolis, 2000), be-
cause the interaction of experienced and skilled
employees leads to the accumulation of implicit or
tacit knowledge (Almeida, Song, & Grant, 2002;
Henderson&Cockburn, 1994; Kogut &Zander, 1992;
Leonard-Barton, 1992), which, in turn, fosters the
development of new technologies (Dosi, 1982). We
thus expect that the high level of commitment
(Donnelley, 1964) and tacit knowledge among em-
ployees (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003) in family firms will
foster the transfer of valuable ideas across hierarchies
and departments (Bammens, Notelaers, & Van Gils,
2015) and thereby support the resource orchestration
within the firm. In other words, the monitoring and
the nonfinancial goals of family firms are likely to
entail high levels of tacit knowledge among em-
ployees and the existence of systems and processes
that are capable of efficiently transforming in-
novation input into innovation output over time.
Thus, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b. Family firms have higher in-
novation output compared to nonfamily firms.
Leadership Variables and the Family
Firm–Innovation Relationship
In the following, we will illuminate how two im-
portant leadership variables affect the aforemen-
tioned hypotheses. Prior research on innovation has
increasingly highlighted the important role of firm
leadership (for a summary, see Rosing, Frese, &
Bausch, 2011), and particularly CEOs (Jung et al.,
2003), in the innovation process. As Crossan and
Apaydin (2010) summarized, firm leaders, and par-
ticularly CEOs, can influence firm innovation in
various ways: First, CEOs shape the firm’s strategy
and resource allocation process (and hence its in-
novation input). While owners provide important
guidelines on how to invest the firm’s resources,
CEOs still possess substantial leeway in adapting
resource-allocation decisions in line with their own
values and beliefs (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Second, CEOs shape the
innovation process and, consequently, innovation
output by selecting and promotingmiddle managers
as “innovation champions” and by guiding them in
their implementation of innovation projects (Jansen,
Vera, & Crossan, 2009). Third, CEOs play an impor-
tant role in setting up structures and systems that
allow for organizational learning and effective
knowledge management (Crossan, Lane, & White,
1999; Damanpour, 1991). Lastly, CEOs can foster an
innovative culture (Pinto & Prescott, 1988).
The notion that the CEO matters is also at the core
of the family business literature. This literature has
highlighted the particularities of family firms with
either a (nonfounder) family member as the CEO
(e.g., Go´mez-Mejı´a et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2011) or
the founder as the CEO (Le Breton-Miller & Miller,
2008). Accordingly, family CEOs and founder CEOs
are considered two distinct types of leaders
(Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Chua, Chrisman, and
Chang (2004) also called for a distinction between
family and founder CEOs in family firms by sug-
gesting that family firms are progressively imbued
with family-specific attributes—most often through
the gradual involvement of later-generation family
5 While a focus on internal human capital and training of
extant staff can be an impediment in times of radical shifts
(e.g., Gilbert, 2005; Ko¨nig et al., 2013), well-trained, expe-
rienced, andmotivated employees positively affect a firm’s
innovativeness in the more common period of evolution-
ary progress characterized by incremental innovation.
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members in the leadership position of the firm
(Holland & Oliver, 1992).6 A distinction between
family and founder CEOs is further warranted be-
cause of founders’ specific risk preferences and
pursued goals (Fahlenbrach, 2009), which we will
explore in more detail below.
Family CEOs and innovation input. We first ar-
gue that the proposed negative relationship between
family firms and innovation input, which we theo-
rized in Hypothesis 1a, becomes even strongerwhen
the CEO is a family member. In other words, we ex-
pect that family firms invest even less in innovation
when a family CEO is at the helm of the company,
due to the following reasons.
First, in family firms with a family CEO, firm de-
cisions made by the CEO in general, and innovation
investments in particular, mirror the family firm
owners’ investment preferences. The underlying ra-
tionale of this is that the familyCEO typically has his or
her personalwealth concentrated in the firm, possesses
control through ownership rights, and pursues non-
financial goals such as maintaining ownership control
within the hands of the family (Chrisman, Chua, &Litz,
2004).Assuch,a familyCEOis likely toshare the family
firm owners’ reluctance to invest in innovation (see
the arguments provided for Hypothesis 1a). The in-
vestment preferences of CEOs who are not family
members, however, are likely to deviate from the in-
vestment preferences of the family firmowners (Singla,
Veliyath, & George, 2013), because their wealth is typ-
ically not concentrated in the firm, they do not possess
substantialownership rights, and theydonot followthe
same nonfinancial goals as family firm owners do.
Hence, a family-external CEO might utilize his or her
managerial discretion (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990)
topursuehigher investment in innovationcompared to
a family CEO, for instance, to push for more strategic
conformity (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2013) or
to stand out in the executive labor market (Gerstner,
Ko¨nig, Enders, & Hambrick, 2013).
Second, we argued above that family firm owners
refuse tomake substantial investments in innovation
because they are reluctant to cede control over their
firm, which would put their socioemotional wealth
at risk. We suggest that this effect is even stronger
when the CEO is a family member, because ceding
control—for instance, to external investors—would
not only limit his or her shareholder voting power (as
an owner) but also restrict the latitude of his or her
managerial actions and decisions (as a manager).
As such, we expect that family CEOs are even less
willing to dedicate substantial amounts of finan-
cial resources to innovation compared to firms
without a family CEO. Thus, we propose the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. Family firms with a family CEO
have even lower innovation input than those
without a family CEO.
Founder CEO and innovation input. Founder
CEOs take on a special role within the group of CEOs;
thus, they differ from family CEOs described above.
More specifically, founder CEOs typically possess in-
vestment preferences that differ from those outlined in
our argumentation for Hypothesis 1a, for the following
two reasons. First, founder CEOs are less sensitive to
risk and uncertainty. The reason for this is that
founding a business requires tolerance of risk and un-
certainty, since entrepreneurial activities are risky by
nature (Caliendo, Fossen, & Kritikos, 2009). Hence,
self-selection implies that foundersare typicallyatease
with making uncertain investments (Jayaraman et al.,
2000; McClelland, 1965), which renders them less re-
luctant to invest in innovation. As risk preferences are
not inherited (Bertrand, Johnson, Samphantharak, &
Schoar, 2008), this effect is likely to hold only for
founderCEOs, but not for later-generation familyCEOs
(Cucculelli, Le Breton‐Miller, & Miller, 2014).
Second, founder CEOs also differ in terms of goals
(Cannella, Jones, &Withers, 2015;Miller et al., 2011).
While, as outlined above, one of family owners’
primary goals is to maintain control over the firm
(Go´mez-Mejı´a et al., 2007), for a founder CEO, this
goal is likely to be superposed by his or her strong
desire for growth (Miller et al., 2011). As innovation
is one of themost promisingways to achieve growth,
founder CEOs are thus expected to be highly willing
to invest in innovation.
Given that founder CEOs, who typically possess
major shares in their firm, have the power to make in-
vestment decisions according to their own investment
preferences, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3a. Family firmswith a founder CEO
havehigher innovation input than thosewithout
a founder CEO.
Family or founder CEOs and innovation output.
Whereas the diverging risk preferences and goals of
family CEOs and founder CEOs lead to substantial
heterogeneity in innovation input among family
firms,wedonot expect to find suchdifferenceswhen
6 While family CEOs are often descendants of the firm’s
founder, they may also be unrelated to the founder if
the family has acquired but not founded the firm under
control.
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investigating innovation output. Instead, we expect
that the presence of either a family CEO or a founder
CEO ina family firm results in evenhigher innovation
output than the presence of an external CEO does. As
outlined above, the innovation process that converts
innovation input into output is less influenced by
resource allocation preferences (as is the case for in-
novation input), and is more influenced by the firm’s
resource orchestration, in particular its monitoring
efforts, and its exploitation of firm-external network
ties, human capital, and routines.
In our baseline hypothesis (Hypothesis 1b), we
argued that owing to their high level of control and
their wealth concentration, family firm owners are
motivated and able to act as “sophisticated” owners
whomonitor innovation activities in a powerful way
and who thereby ensure efficient conversion of in-
novation input into innovation output. If the CEO is
a family or founder CEO, his or her willingness and
ability to efficiently monitor the innovation process
will be even higher (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Pre-
vious research in the context of technological in-
novation in the pharmaceutical industry (Cardinal,
2001) has shown that such increased control on not
only the firm level but also the project level leads to
a more efficacious and less wasteful innovation
process. This line of argumentation is valid for both
family and founder CEOs, since both types of CEOs
are characterized by high levels of personal control
and wealth concentration and are thus willing and
able to engage in an efficient monitoring process.
Hence, we argue that the alignment of interests be-
tween owners andmanagers in the case of founder or
family CEOs amplifies the positive relationship be-
tween family firms and innovation output.
Another core element of our baseline hypothesis is
that access to long-established, trust-based relation-
ships with customers, suppliers, and other (family)
firms endows family firms with valuable comple-
mentary assets and knowledge that are beneficial for
the efficient conversion of innovation input into
output. Family firms with family or founder CEOs
might be even more able to exploit such relation-
ships. First, family and founder CEOs closely iden-
tify with “their” firm (Berrone et al., 2012), and are
likely to stickwith their firm, evenwhen the firm is in
trouble7 (Lansberg, 1999). Such characteristics may
enhance their partners’ trust in the CEO’s benevo-
lence and long-term view and may render partners
more likely to openly provide candid and useful
feedback to the family firm. As trust is an important
antecedent for harnessing a firm’s network in the
innovation process (Phelps, 2010), we argue that
firms with a family or founder CEO are particularly
able to exploit external knowledge to create in-
novation output. Both founder and family CEOs
might be considered trusted partners because of their
high levels of attachment to the firm (Wasserman,
2003; Zellweger et al., 2012).
Moreover, we argued above that family firms
benefit from the accumulation of human capital
within the firm and the creation of efficient routines
when converting innovation input into innovation
output.When theCEO is a family or founderCEO,his
or her individual-level human capital might be
beneficial for harvesting such advantageous firm-
level human capital during the innovation process
and, as such, for the family firm’s resource orches-
tration. In particular, family and founder CEOs are
endowedwith superior knowledge, particularly tacit
knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi,
1973; Von Krogh, Ichijo, & Nonaka, 2000), about
their firm’s members, routines, and stakeholders,
which external CEOs possess to a lesser degree. For
instance, family and founder CEOs are likely to
possess superior knowledge about which em-
ployees to select as innovation champions and
about which task to delegate to which group within
the organization. Such tacit knowledge is likely to
foster superior conversion of innovation input into
innovation output for several reasons. First, the
CEO’s deep, implicit knowledge about the family
firm’s processes and systems and about the fine-
grained (individual-, group-, and organizational-
level) capabilities that are available across the firm
(Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2015) will allow for
superior orchestration of resources and thus supe-
rior conversion of innovation input into output.
Given that knowledge management is a challenging
task that is at the core of the innovation process
(Madhavan & Grover, 1998; Subramaniam & Youndt,
2005), such individual-level tacit knowledge of fam-
ily or founder CEOs will lead to superior innovation
output (Carnes & Ireland, 2013; Sirmon et al., 2011).
Second, because of their profound understanding
of their firm’s culture and their personal, strong affil-
iation with the firm, family and founder CEOs are
uniquely positioned to “make innovation happen via
a strong vision” (Adams et al., 2006: 31, referring to
Pinto & Prescott, 1988).
7 In addition to their often–observed high levels of
commitment to the firm, family CEOs and founder CEOs
have less employment risks owing to their long–term
contracts that are typically not tied to performance goals
(Go´mez–Mejı´a, Nu´ñez–Nickel, Gutierrez, 2001).
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Both family and founder CEOs possess such valu-
able individual-level human capital, particularly
knowledge about the internal affairs of their firm.
Family CEOs are expected to possess this knowledge
because they are a “familiar and motivated pool of
talent, thanks in part to the more effective trans-
mission of knowledge [compared to family-external
CEOs] about the business from a founder to his or her
offspring” (Miller et al., 2014: 549),with the transferof
knowledge often starting as early as the future CEO’s
childhood (Cabrera-Suarez, Saa-Perez, & Garcia-
Almeida, 2001; Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2015;
Naldi, Cennamo, Corbetta, & Go´mez‐Mejı´a, 2013).
Founder CEOs as “focal points” (Nelson, 2003) of
their organizations possess this kind of knowledge
because they have known the business since its in-
ception. Indeed, prior research has often emphasized
the unique human capital of founder CEOs (Colombo
& Grilli, 2005; Gimmon & Levie, 2010; Kaplan,
Sensoy, & Stro¨mberg, 2009; Zingales, 2000). We thus
propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2b. Family firms with a family CEO
have higher innovation output than those with-
out a family CEO.
Hypothesis 3b. Family firmswith a founder CEO
have higher innovation output than those with-
out a founder CEO.
Table 1 provides an overview of the proposed re-
lationships, as well as the underlying rationales.
METHODS
Sample and Coding
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a meta-
analytic study following the established guidelines
put forth in management and economics research
(Buckley, Devinney, &Tang, 2013; Kepes,McDaniel,
Brannick, & Banks, 2013; Stanley et al., 2013). We
used five complementary search strategies to iden-
tify the population of studies that quantitatively
compared the innovation behavior of family firms
with that of nonfamily firms (Heugens, Van Essen, &
Van Oosterhout, 2009). First, we consulted several
review andmeta-analytic articles, such as a narrative
review on innovation in family firms (e.g., DeMassis
et al., 2013) and a publishedmeta-analysis on family
firms and firm performance (O’Boyle, Pollack, &
Rutherford, 2012). Second, we searched five major
electronic databases (ABI/INFORM Global, EconLit,
Google Scholar, JSTOR, and SSRN) by using the
following search terms: “blockholder,” “families,”
“family business,” “family control,” “family firm,”
“family ownership,” “founder,” “founding family,”
“lone founder,” and “ownership.” We combined
these key terms with the following terms related to
innovation variables: “innovation,” “patent,” “new
product introduction,” and “R&D.” Third, we con-
ducted a manual search of journals in the disci-
plines of economics, finance, and management that
periodically publish articles related to family firms.
Fourth, after collecting an initial set of studies, we
used a “snowballing” technique (Von Hippel,
Franke, & Pru¨gl, 2009) that involved backward-
tracking all the references reported in the articles
and tracing forward all articles that cite the original
articles by using Google Scholar. Fifth, we directly
contacted authors of one or several papers relevant to
this topic who did not report information on effect
sizes or whose studies we could not retrieve. We
asked these authors for a correlation table, regression
output, and additional empirical studies. After con-
ducting these five steps and removing any manu-
scripts that used data that were identical to those of
other studies, we arrived at a final sample of 108
primary studies, which consisted of 71 published
manuscripts (i.e., journal articles) and 37 un-
published manuscripts (comprising 32 working pa-
pers and five theses) covering 42 countries in the
1981–2012 period (see Appendix A for an overview
of the 108 primary studies). This systematic search
process, which aimed to minimize the odds of
“missing auseful paper that lies outsideone’s regular
purview” (White, 1994: 44), followed recent best
practices for sampling in meta-analyses (Buckley
et al., 2013; Stanley et al., 2013).
Subsequently, we read all the articles and de-
veloped a coding protocol (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001)
for extracting data related to all the relevant vari-
ables, including effect sizes, sample sizes, and lead-
ership variables. While one author extracted and
codedall the data, another author coded a subsample
of 68 randomly selected effect sizes to assess the
degree of agreement in extracting information from
primary studies (Stanley et al., 2013). We obtained
a high inter-rater agreement of .98 (Cohen’s k co-
efficient; Cohen, 1960).
MASEM Procedure
We used MASEM (Bergh et al., 2014; Cheung &
Chan, 2005; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995) to test our
hypotheses. The MASEM procedure combines the
techniques of structural equation modeling with
those of meta-analysis (Cheung & Chan, 2005). The
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technique is ideal for testing our hypotheses because
it allows us to test the relationships among family
firms, innovation input, and innovation output in
a single model. MASEM is more advantageous than
more conventional meta-analytic techniques be-
cause the relationships under investigation do not
need to have been tested in each primary study and
because the technique avoids biased estimates when
simultaneity effects may be involved and when the
risk of collinearity among variables exists (Geyskens,
Krishnan, Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009).
MASEM tests were conducted in a two-stage pro-
cedure (Carney, Gedajlovic, Heugens, Van Essen, &
Van Oosterhout, 2011). In the first stage, we used
Hedges and Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA;
Hedges & Olkin, 1985) to compute the meta-analytic
mean associations between all variables, based on
Pearson product-moment correlations (r). The out-
come of this procedure was a meta-analytic correla-
tion table (see Table 2). We used random-effects
HOMA, which accounts for the potential heteroge-
neity of effect size distributions and is considered
TABLE 1
Summary of Predictions
Innovation input Innovation output
Family firm Hypothesis 1a: Lower innovation input in family firms: Hypothesis 1b: Higher innovation output in family firms:
cWealth concentration leads to a reluctance to make
uncertain investments. Innovation is a particularly
uncertain investment.
cAhigh level of control leads to a better ability tomonitor the
innovation process and thus avoid “waste.”
c Nonfinancial goals, particularly the desire to maintain
control, lead to a reluctance to take on external money.
Investments that match or even exceed industry-average
R&D expenses often require external funding.
c The desire to avoid uncertainty (stemming from wealth
concentration) and the desire to maintain control (i.e.,
a nonfinancial goal) leads to a high willingness to monitor
the innovation process.
c A high level of control allows the owners’ (low innovation
input) investment preferences to be followed.
c The pursuit of nonfinancial goals over time also leads to
privileged access to networks and to unique firm-internal
tacit knowledge and routines, which have been shown to
be beneficial throughout the innovation process.
Family CEO Hypothesis 2a: Even lower innovation inputwhen the CEO is
a family CEO:
Hypothesis 2b: Even higher innovation outputwhen the CEO
is a family CEO:
c The superior alignment of owners’ and family CEO’s
preferences (high level of control of the family CEO) leads
to better implementation of family owners’ investment
preferences.
c Family CEOs have increased power (due to high level of
control) and motivation (due to wealth concentration) to
monitor the innovation process owing to an overlap of
ownership and management.
c Family CEOs’ own wealth concentration and their
nonfinancial goal to retain control (incl. managerial
power) is at stake if external funding is used to finance
innovation projects.
c Family CEOs havemore privileged network access because
of increased trust, which will be beneficial throughout the
innovation process (effect of nonfinancial goals, as argued
in Hypothesis 1b, strengthened).
c Family CEOs have individual-level tacit knowledge (given
the inter-generational knowledge transfer), which helps
themtoefficientlyorchestrate the resourceswithin the firm
during the innovationprocess (effect ofnonfinancial goals,
as argued in Hypothesis 1b, strengthened).
Founder CEO Hypothesis 3a: Higher innovation input when the CEO is
a founder CEO:
Hypothesis 3b: Even higher innovation outputwhen the CEO
is a founder CEO:
c Founder CEOs, due to a self-selection process, are more
risk-seeking and less sensitive to uncertainty (thereby
alleviating the effect ofwealth concentration, as argued for
Hypothesis 1a). Consequently, they are less reluctant to
invest in innovation.
c Founder CEOs have increased power (due to high level of
control) and motivation (due to wealth concentration) to
monitor the innovation process owing to an overlap of
ownership and management.
c Founder CEOs are particularly driven by goals to grow the
firm. Growth can be well facilitated by investment into
innovation. Moreover, concerns about nonfinancial goals
(as argued for Hypothesis 1a) are less important.
c Founder CEOs have more privileged network access
because of increased trust, which will be beneficial
throughout the innovation process (effect of nonfinancial
goals, as argued in Hypothesis 1b, strengthened).
c Founder CEOs have individual-level tacit knowledge
(given their focal position within the firm), which helps
them to efficiently orchestrate resources within the firm
during the innovationprocess (effect ofnonfinancial goals,
as argued in Hypothesis 1b, strengthened).
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moreconservative than fixed-effectsHOMA(Kisamore
& Brannick, 2008; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In re-
cent years, artifact-corrected meta-analytic methods
(ACMA; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004) have become in-
creasingly popular (Heugens & Lander, 2009). How-
ever, because most studies on family firms have been
basedon independentlyverifiable economicdata rather
than on self-reported psychometric data, random-
effects HOMA is the more appropriate choice for es-
timating mean effect sizes in our research setting
(Kepes et al., 2013; Rosenthal, 1991).8
When multiple measurements of the focal effect
were reported in one study (such as different defi-
nitions of a family firm), we included all of them in
our analyses. Monte Carlo simulations showed that
procedures using the complete set of measurements
outperformed those representing each study by
a single value in areas such as parameter significance
testing andparameter estimation accuracy (Bijmolt&
Pieters, 2001). For accuracy reasons, we weighted
the effect sizes by their inverse variance weight (w)
(Hedges &Olkin, 1985).9Next,weused theseweights
to compute the standard error of the mean effect size
and its corresponding confidence interval.10
In the second stage, we treated the meta-analytic
correlation matrix that was generated by the HOMA
procedure as the observed correlation matrix and
subjected it to regular maximum likelihood struc-
tural equation modeling routines to test the afore-
mentioned hypotheses (Cheung & Chan, 2005). To
address sample size differences across the corre-
lation coefficients that were included in our ma-
trix, we based our analysis on the harmonic mean
sample size (Landis, 2013). The harmonic mean is
less sensitive to outliers than the arithmetic mean is;
thus, it provides more correct and conservative t-
values for model parameters (Geyskens, Steenkamp,
& Kumar, 2006). To test our hypotheses, we assessed
the following: (1) the direct effect of family firm sta-
tus on innovation input, (2) the effect of family firm
status on innovation output, and (3) the effect of in-
novation input on innovation output.We thus tested
the following system of simultaneous equations:
Innovation input5b1family firm status
1b2firm size1 « (1)
Innovation output5b3family firm status
1b4firm size
1b5Innovation input1 «
(2)
The models also controlled for the influence of firm
size (total assets, sales, or employees) because firm
size is known to affect firms’ strategic decisions
(Beatty & Zajac, 1994) in general, and innovation in
particular (Schumpeter, 1934).
Innovation input. As innovation input, we con-
sidered those variables coded in the primary studies
that relate to R&D investment: (1) the ratio of a firm’s
total annual R&D expenditures to total sales (cf.
Munari et al., 2010), (2) the ratio of a firm’s total an-
nualR&Dexpenditures to total assets (also referred to
as R&D intensity [Wu, Levitas, & Priem, 2005]), (3)
R&D expenditures divided by the sum of R&D ex-
penditures and capital expenditures (Anderson
et al., 2012), (4) the ratio of the number of R&D-
focused employees to total employees (Sirmon,
Arregle, Hitt, & Webb, 2008), (5) the ratio of exter-
nal expenses for R&D to total sales (also referred to as
external technology acquisition [Kotlar, De Massis,
Frattini, Fang, & Bianchi, 2013]), and (6) R&D ex-
penses divided by the firm’s equity market value
(Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc, 2011). Appendix A pro-
vides an overview of the operationalization of the
variables used in the primary studies.
Innovation output.Wecategorized avariable as an
innovation output variable if it related to new prod-
uct introduction and patent creation. In this cate-
gory,we includedvariables such as the following: (1)
the percentage of sales that consisted of new prod-
ucts or services introduced (Wu, 2008), (2) the
number of patents granted to a firm (Tsao & Lien,
2013), (3) the ratio of thenumber of patents granted to
a firm to R&D investment (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb,
2009), (4) the number of patent citations (Hsieh, Yeh,
& Chen, 2010), (5) the ratio of the number of patent
8 The results of robustness tests based on ACMA are
similar to those of theHedges andOlkin–typemeta–analysis
and support our findings. HOMA (bivariate as well as bi-
variate and partial) are shown in Appendices B and C.
ACMA results are available upon request from the authors.
9 w is calculated as follows:wi5
1
se2i 1 v^ u
, where se is the
standard error of the effect size and v^ u is the variance
component of the random effects. These variables are cal-
culated as seðzrÞ5 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
n2 3
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10 The meta–analytic mean is calculated as follows:
ES5
+ðw 3ESÞ
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, and with its 95% confidence interval computed as
Lower5 ES2 1:96ðseESÞ, Upper5 ES2 1:96ðseESÞ.
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citations to R&D investment (Anderson et al., 2009),
and (6) whether the firm introduced innovation
during a determined number of years (Laursen,
Masciarelli, & Prencipe, 2012).
Family firm. We consider firms that were classi-
fied as a “family firm” in the primary studies to be
family firms for this meta-analysis. As the literature
has not yet converged on a clear definition of what
a family firm is (see e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller,
Lester, & Cannella, 2007; Villalonga & Amit, 2006),
the primary studies that were used for this meta-
analysis relied on different criteria to distinguish
family and nonfamily firms (see Appendix A for
details).11 To take this heterogeneity into account,we
created the following four mutually exclusive cate-
gories of family firm definitions, which account for
all definitions applied in the respective primary
study, andwe used those study-level variables in the
HOMA and MARA calculations: (1) firms with
a substantial presence of family members in owner-
shipbyeither voting or cash flow rights (Peng& Jiang,
2010), (2) firms with a substantial presence of family
members in top management positions (Miller et al.,
2007), (3) firms with a family presence in ownership
andmanagement (Go´mez-Mejı´a et al., 2014), and (4)
firms with a family presence in ownership or man-
agement (Villalonga & Amit, 2006).
To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we applied a
dummy variable distinguishing between “family
firms”—independent of the specific definition used
by the primary studies—andnonfamily firms. To test
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 3a, and 3b, we disentangled
family firms with a family CEO or a founder CEO
based on the information on founder presence and
the involved family generations presented in the
primary studies.
MARA Procedure
The relationship between family firms and in-
novation input and output as reported in this meta-
analytic study might be affected by the research
design and model specification used in the primary
studies and by institutional effects (Scott, 2001). To
account for these effects, we applied MARA (Lipsey
& Wilson, 2001) as a post hoc test. In our MARA
analyses, the dependent variable is the effect size for
the relationship between family firm and innovation
input or for the relationship between family firm and
innovation output in a given sample. Following Van
Essen, Otten, and Carberry (2015) and a long tradi-
tion of meta-analytic research in economics (Klomp
& De Haan, 2010; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2012), we
used both bivariate (r) and partial correlation co-
efficients (rxy.z) as our effect size estimates for the
MARA procedure, which, in our case, capture the
association between family firm and innovation in-
put (Model 1) and between family firm and in-
novation output (Model 2) with a given set of n
control variables. Both effect sizes are easily in-
terpretable and are scale-free measures of a linear
relationship; thus, averages for the dependent and
independent variables are not needed. The partial
correlation coefficient can be computed from the
t-statistics and degrees of freedom that are reported
in the primary studies (Greene, 2003). MARA is a
weighted least squares technique that assesses the
relationship between moderator variables and effect
size (e.g., family firm and innovation input or output)
with the purpose ofmodeling previously unexplained
variance in the effect size distribution (Lipsey &
Wilson, 2001). We used a weighted regression to ac-
count for differences in precision across effect sizes.
The statistically preferableweighting variable is again
w (Hedges & Olkin, 1985).
One of the unique advantages of using MARA is
that it allows us to model the variance in the effect
size distribution in light of country-level institu-
tional variables that were not included in the pri-
mary studies (Carney et al., 2011). We used MARA
to test the effect of two important institutional vari-
ables, as recent innovation literature has increasingly
accounted for institutional moderators that affect firm
innovation input and output (Barbosa & Faria, 2011;
Chesbrough, 1999; Hoskisson, Covin, Volberda, &
Johnson, 2011; Lundvall, 2010; Nelson, 1993). First,
we controlled for the level of minority shareholder
protection. In many cases, family firm owners do
not possess the entirety of their firm’s ownership
shares but possess only a substantial fraction thereof
(Anderson&Reeb,2003;Villalonga&Amit, 2006).The
remaining shares are in the hands of other, nonfamily
(minority) owners, such as institutional owners or
dispersed shareholders, who might have goals and
interests that deviate from those of the family owners.
To measure the impact of jurisdiction-level legal pro-
tection against the misuse of corporate assets by di-
rectors or large shareholders for their personal gain,
we used the Spamann (2010) “anti-director rights in-
dex.” Strong anti-director laws prevent insiders from
engaging in self-benefitting transactions and decision
11 Most of the primary studies used dummy variables to
differentiate between family firms and nonfamily firms,
and only a few studies measured family control on a con-
tinuous scale, for instance based on ownership shares in
the hands of the family.
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making based on their own utility function (Dyck &
Zingales, 2004). Second, structural differences among
countries regarding the education level of the work-
force might influence firms’ ability to efficiently con-
vert innovation input into output (Chesbrough, 1999).
Since human capital-related arguments play an im-
portant role in our baseline Hypothesis 1b, studying
the effect of the education level of the workforce ap-
pears particularly reasonable. We thus measured the
availability of employees in the work force with a ter-
tiary education, which reflects the proportion of the
labor force that has a tertiary education as a percentage
of the total labor force in that specific country (www.
worldbank.org). Furthermore, we controlled for the
prevalenceof family firms in acountryand forGDPper
capita, as these variables may affect the availability of
resources for and organizational behavior of family
firms.
We also included a number of control variables
related to the research designs and methodological
approaches applied by the primary studies. First, we
checked for effects caused by the use of different
definitions of a family firm in the primary studies. As
explained in the section on our independent vari-
able, we distinguished between definitions based
on ownership, management, ownership and man-
agement, and ownership or management (reference
group). Second, as publicly listed companies might
feel particular pressure to act in a strategically con-
forming way (Miller et al., 2013), we further con-
trolled for whether the primary studies focused on
publicly listed firms,mixed (publicly listed and pri-
vate) firms, or private firms (reference category).
Third, to account for measurement artifacts, we
dummy-codedwhether innovation input and output
in the primary studies were logarithmically trans-
formed or not (reference group).We further included
several control variables to account for potential
methodological artifacts. Since insignificant results
are less likely to be published, we tested for the “file
drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979) by including
a dummy variable denoting whether a study was
published or not (reference group). To account for
publication outlet status effects, we included each
publication’s five-year ISI impact factor. To allow for
the possibility that the focal relationship changes
over time, we controlled for the median year of the
sample window. To test whether the thoroughness
of the primary study’s methodological approach
affected the observed effect sizes, we also included
dummy variables indicating whether the primary
studies used panel or cross-sectional (reference
group) data, and whether they controlled for the
endogeneity of family control on innovation input
and output or not (reference group). Finally, we in-
cluded dummy variables to assess whether the pri-
mary studies controlled for industry effects or not
(reference group), since one could argue that family
firms self-select into specific industries that are
characterized by low or high levels of innovation.
Finally, we controlled for whether the primary stud-
ies included year effects or not (reference group).
We also tested the robustness of the results against
several model specification artifacts. To account for
omitted variable bias, we controlled for the number
of variables included in the regression. We also in-
corporated separate dummy variables that indicated
whether the following firmand governance variables
were included in the regressions in the primary
studies: firm age (since innovation input and output
might change over the life cycle of a firm), firm debt
(since highly leveraged firms might lack financial
resources to fund innovation [Kochhar & David,
1996]), firm diversification (since diversification has
been argued to correlate with lower investment in
innovation [Kochhar & David, 1996]), firm free cash
flow (since slack resources might either impede or
foster innovation [Greve, 2003]), firm risk (since risk
likely affects investment preferences), firm size
(since Schumpeter [1934] argued that only large
firms have the ability and incentives to innovate),
percentage of firm internationalization (since com-
petition on a global base might encourage firms
to pay more attention to innovation), prior firm
performance (since evidence has suggested that
performance below an aspiration level motivates
family firms to temporarily prioritize financial over
nonfinancial goals [Chrisman & Patel, 2012]), prior
firm R&D expenditures (since previously generated
knowledge supports harvesting innovation input
[Zahra & George, 2002]), CEO duality (since CEOs
holding dual positions might be particularly able to
pursue their preferred investments), CEO tenure
(since the CEO’s ability to efficiently transform input
into outputmight increase over time,while his or her
proclivity to invest in innovation might simulta-
neously decrease), firm affiliated with a business
group (since such structures might motivate family
firms to avoid necessary innovations [Morck &
Yeung, 2003]), dual class shares (since dual class
shares might aid family firms in pursuing their pre-
ferred investments), inside ownership (since in-
side ownership has been shown to affect the CEO’s
goals and motivation [Hoskisson et al., 2002]), and
percentage ownership of largest owner (since the
numberof ownership stakesmight be an indicator for
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the family’s ability to pursue their preferences). Each
of these variables was controlled for in at least 5% of
all the effect sizes in the primary studies. To control
for any further effects caused by the industrial con-
text chosen for the primary studies, we also con-
trolled for whether samples from primary studies
included family firms participating in high-tech
industries.
RESULTS
MASEM Results
Table2presents themeta-analytic correlation table.
Cells below the diagonal represent 15 separate
HOMAs and report the meta-analytic mean correla-
tion for each relationship, which we used to run the
MASEManalyses. Cells above the diagonal report the
number of observations (N) and the number of effect
sizes (k) on which the meta-analytic mean is based.
Tables 3a, b, and c present the MASEM results.
Table 3a presents the MASEM results for Hy-
potheses 1a and 1b. As hypothesized, we find a neg-
ative and significant relationship between family
firm and innovation input (Hypothesis 1a; b52.03,
p , .01) and a positive and significant association
between family firm and innovation output (Hy-
pothesis 1b; b5 .03, p, .01).12 In line with previous
findings, the relationship between innovation input
and innovation output is generally positive and
significant (Acs & Audretsch, 1988). The results in
Table 3b show that family firms invest even less in
innovation if the CEO is a (nonfounder) member of
the controlling family (Hypothesis 2a;b52.04, p,
.01 as compared tob52.03 inTable 3a) and that the
positive effect of family firms on innovation output
is even stronger if the CEO is a (nonfounder) mem-
ber of the controlling family (Hypothesis 2b;b5 .09,
p , .01 as compared to b 5 0.03 in Table 3a).13
Z-tests confirm the significant differences of family
firms in general and those with family CEOs for in-
novation output only (Hypothesis 2a z521.17; p,
.24, Hypothesis 2b z 5 10.21; p , .01), resulting in
strong support for Hypothesis 2b but only weak
support for Hypothesis 2a. Table 3c presents the
MASEM results for Hypotheses 3a and 3b. We find
that the founder CEO positively and significantly
(instead of negatively and significantly, as was the
case for family firms in general) influences in-
novation input (Hypothesis 3a; b5 .06, p, .01; z5
2.75; p, .01), supporting Hypothesis 3a. However,
contrary to our expectations, founder CEOs are
negatively related to innovation output (Hypothesis
3b; b52.09, p, .01; z5243.71; p, .01),14 leading
us to reject Hypothesis 3b.
TABLE 2
Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix
Family firm Family CEO Founder CEO Innovation input Innovation output Firm size
Family firm 51,713 (82) 47,178 (77) 135,167 (214) 17,423 (37) 184,176 (279)
Family CEO 0.23** 8,096 (14) 15,261 (27) 2,399 (4) 17,493 (30)
Founder CEO 0.12** –0.09 14,196 (31) 1,211 (5) 16,024 (34)
Innovation input –0.03** –0.04 0.06† 11,835 (13) 66,691 (94)
Innovation output 0.01 0.07* –0.10† 0.13** 17,312 (26)
Firm size –0.05** –0.04 –0.09** –0.01 0.23**
Notes:Cells below thediagonal containmeaneffect sizes (mean).Cells above thediagonal contain the total numberof observationsmeasured
by the number of firms observed from primary studies (n) and number of effect sizes (k) in parentheses.
† p , .10
*p , .05
**p , .01
12 The reported effect size represents innovation output
in family firms when controlling for innovation input. In
order to assess the overall effect of family firm status on
innovation output, one has to correct this value by the
lower innovation input in family firms (–.03). Since in-
novation input and innovation output are correlated by
a factor of .13, the corrected effect of family firm status on
innovation output can be calculated as: .031 (–.03 * .13)5
.026.
13 Correcting for lower innovation input in family
firms with family CEOs, this value must be adapted to:
.09 1 (–.04 3 0.14) 5 .084 if one is interested in the
overall innovation output of family firms with family
CEOs.
14 Correcting for higher innovation input in family
firms with founder CEOs, this value must be adapted to:
2.09 1 (0.06 3 0.14) 5 20.82 if one is interested in the
overall innovation output of family firms with founder
CEOs.
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Post Hoc MARA Results
Table 4 presents theMARA results. The results for
Model 1 show how several control variables affect
the effect size of the family firm–innovation input
relationship, and the results for Model 2 show how
these variables affect the effect size of the family
firm–innovation output relationship.
Model 1 fits the data reasonably well (R25 .25).
Regarding country-level differences, we find that
the level of minority shareholder protection,
as captured by the anti-director rights index
(Spamann, 2010), significantly strengthens the
negative association between family control and
innovation input (p , .05). In other words, when
the level of minority shareholder protection is
higher, family firms have even lower innovation
input than when the level of minority shareholder
protection is lower. The negative and marginally
significant coefficient for the ownership definition
dummy (p , .10) indicates that studies that have
based their definition of a family firm on ownership
have found that family firms invest even less in
innovation. We also find significant effects for
several measurement, methodological, and model
specification dummies: In studies that logarithmi-
cally transformed the dependent variables (p, .01)
and in studies that controlled for prior firm per-
formance (p , .10), the effect size of the family
firm–innovation input relationship is significantly
less negative. In studies that were published in
journals with a higher ISI impact factor (p , .01),
more recent studies (i.e., those that have a higher
median year of the sample window; p , .01),
studies that used a panel design (p , .10), and
studies that controlled for firm debt (p , .05), the
effect sizes of the family firm–innovation input re-
lationship are significantly more negative, in-
dicating that those studies have found that family
firms have even lower innovation input. Moreover,
studies based on samples with a higher (logarithm
of) GDP per capita have found a more negative ef-
fect size of the family firm–innovation input re-
lationship (p , .01).
Model 2 presents the MARA results regarding in-
novation output. The model fits the data very well
(R2 5 .48). Regarding country-level differences, the
availability of highly educated workers in a country
strengthens the positive effect of family firms on in-
novation output (p , .05). In other words, when the
proportion of workforce with a tertiary education is
high in a country, family firms have even higher in-
novation output than nonfamily firms do. Moreover,
TABLE 3c
Founder CEO MASEM Results
Predictors Innovation input
Innovation
output
Founder CEO
(Hypothesis
3a, Hypothesis 3b)
0.06 (5.52)** –0.09 (–8.47)**
Firm size –0.00 (–0.43) 0.22 (21.50)**
Innovation input 0.14 (13.26)**
Harmonic mean n
(firms observed)
5,377
X2 0.00 (1.00)
GFI 1.00
RMSEA 0.00
Notes: t-values are given in parentheses; GFI 5 Goodness of fit
statistics; RMSEA5 Root mean square error of approximation.
**p , .01
TABLE 3a
Pooled MASEM Results
Predictors Innovation input
Innovation
output
Family firm
(Hypothesis
1a, Hypothesis 1b)
–0.03 (–4.96)** 0.03 (4.31)**
Firm size –0.01 (–1.87) 0.23 (39.14)**
Innovation input 0.13 (22.41)**
Harmonic mean n
(firms observed)
26,376
X2 0.00 (1.00)
GFI 1.00
RMSEA 0.00
Notes: t-values are given in parentheses; GFI 5 Goodness of fit
statistics; RMSEA5 Root mean square error of approximation.
**p , .01
TABLE 3b
Family CEO MASEM Results
Predictors Innovation input
Innovation
output
Family CEO
(Hypothesis
2a, Hypothesis 2b)
–0.04 (–3.75)** 0.09 (8.18)**
Firm size –0.01 (–1.08) 0.23 (22.66)**
Innovation input 0.14 (13.10)**
Harmonic mean n
(firms observed)
8,611
X2 0.00 (1.00)
GFI 1.00
RMSEA 0.00
Notes: t-values are given in parentheses; GFI 5 Goodness of fit
statistics; RMSEA5 Root mean square error of approximation.
**p , .01
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we find that the effect size of the family firm–
innovation output relationship is significantly more
positive for studies that have included both publicly
listed and private firms (p , .10), as compared to
studies focusing solely on private firms. The effect
size of the family firm–innovation output re-
lationship has been significantly less positive in
studies that logarithmically transformed the de-
pendent variable (p , .05), studies that controlled
for firm debt (p , .05), studies that controlled for
the percentage of firm internationalization (p ,
.01), and studies that included family firms in high-
tech industries (p, .01). The effect size of the family
firm–innovation output relationship is significantly
morepositivewhen the ISI impact factorof the journal
is high (p , .05), when studies controlled for prior
firm performance (p, .10), and when the prevalence
of family firms in the country is high (p, .05). Table 5
summarizes the hypotheses, the methodological ap-
proaches to test the hypotheses, and the results of the
MASEM and MARA calculations.
DISCUSSION
Based on a meta-analysis of 108 primary studies
covering 42 countries, we showed that while family
firms invest significantly less in innovation than
nonfamily firms do, their innovation output, ceteris
paribus, is higher. The engagement of a family CEO
leads to a further slight decrease in innovation input,
but simultaneously increases the innovation output
of the firm. The picture, however, is different when
the founder leads the firm: in such cases, innovation
input is increased (as expected), while, contrary to
our expectations, innovation output is decreased.
We conjecture that this unexpected finding might
result from such firms’ limited access to trusted
network partners, firm-internal human capital, and
beneficial internal processes, which might only
build up over time. As the post hoc test reveals, the
associations among family firms, innovation input,
and innovation output are sensitive to institutional
factors: a higher level of minority shareholder pro-
tection further decreases innovation input in family
firms, and the availability of a well-educated work-
force supports family firms in their attempts to effi-
ciently turn innovation input into output.
Theoretical and Empirical Contributions and
Avenues for Further Research
Research on innovation. The findings of our
study yield important insights for the literature on
innovation. First and foremost, our findings inform
theongoingdebate on the antecedents of innovation
input and output (for a summary, see Ahuja et al.,
2008). We thereby extend and challenge extant lit-
erature by studying a determinant of innovation
that affects innovation input and output in oppo-
site ways—through family control. While previ-
ous research has noted the potential existence of
such factors—e.g., centralization and formalization
(Damanpour, 1991; Pierce & Delbecq, 1977)—this
study, to the best of our knowledge, is one of the
first to systematically investigate the effects of such
a factor on innovation input and output simulta-
neously, and to provide a coherent and consistent
theoretical explanation of such patterns. The find-
ing that family control affects innovation input
negatively, but innovation output positively, chal-
lenges our knowledge on innovation, since it dem-
onstrates that findings on the antecedents of
innovation input cannot be easily generalized to
innovation output. In other words, some of the pre-
viously identified drivers of innovationmight indeed
be “double-edged swords” that foster innovation in-
put buthamper innovationoutput.On the otherhand,
previous research might also have identified several
“false enemies;” that is, factors that impede in-
novation input, but at the same time—like family
control—increase the firm’s conversion rate and ul-
timately imply higher innovation output.
Further, the findingsof our article canbeviewedas
a call for a shift in scholarly attention to the “con-
version rate” of the innovation process—that is, how
much units of output can be generated by one unit of
innovation input15—and in particular the ante-
cedents of this conversion rate. The majority of
firms worldwide—such as businesses in emerging
economies, new ventures, or other small- and
medium-sized companies—operate under substantial
resource constraints and, since theyareunable to raise
their investments in innovation to catch up with
competition, are thus required to work particularly
efficiently—andconstantly increase their efficiency in
suchcompetitiveenvironments.Assuch, thenotionof
conversion rates and efficient or parsimonious in-
novation processes (Verona, 1999) is particularly im-
portant. Understanding the factors that either increase
or impede the conversion of innovation input into
innovation output will help advance scholarly
knowledge about firms’ competitive advantages
stemming from innovation, and will also be of
15 Inmathematical terms, conversion_rate5 d (Innovation_
Output) / d (Innovation_Input).
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outmost interest to practitioners. Through this
study, we extend extant scholarly knowledge by
identifying the committed and informed monitor-
ing of family owners; the family firms’ unique
access to a trusted, firm-external network; aswell as
tacit knowledge and routines available in family
firms as facilitators of the efficient conversion of
innovation input into innovation output.
TABLE 4
MARA Results
Variable Model 1 FF-innovation input Model 2 FF-innovation output
Institutional variables
Anti-director rights –0.02 (0.01)* 0.10 (0.06)
Availability of level force with tertiary education 0.17 (0.14) 1.54 (0.62)*
Prevalence of family firms –0.01 (0.08) 1.67 (0.65)*
Ln GDP per capita –0.03 (0.01)** –0.09 (0.15)
Family firm definition
Ownership –0.03 (0.02)† .02 (0.03)
Management 0.00 (0.02) –0.02 (0.03)
Ownership and management –0.02 (0.02) 0.12 (0.17)
Type of family firm
Publicly listed 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.10)
Mixed (publicly listed and private) –0.03 (0.04) 0.15 (0.08)†
Measurement artifacts
Logarithmically transformed 0.08 (0.03)** –0.12 (0.05)*
Methodological artifacts
Published study –0.01 (0.01) –0.08 (0.09)
ISI impact factor –0.01 (0.00)** 0.06 (0.03)*
Median year of sample window –0.01 (0.00)** 0.01 (0.01)
Panel design –0.04 (0.02)† –0.17 (0.11)
Endogeneity check 0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
Industry effects –0.01 (0.06) 0.23 (0.17)
Year effects –0.01 (0.04) –0.03 (0.06)
Model specification artifacts
Number of variables in regression –0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.01)
Firm age 0.08 (0.06) 0.12 (0.08)
Firm debt –0.10 (0.04)* –0.39 (0.18)*
Firm diversification 0.03 (0.06) –0.67 (0.42)
Firm free cash flow –0.02 (0.05) –0.32 (0.26)
Firm risk –0.05 (0.07) –0.23 (0.26)
Firm size –0.02 (0.08) 0.03 (0.17)
Percentage of firm internationalization 0.09 (0.06) –0.44 (0.17)**
Prior firm performance 0.10 (0.06)† 0.66 (0.37)†
Prior firm R&D expenditures 0.11 (0.08) –0.00 (0.04)
CEO duality 0.00 (0.06) –0.03 (0.06)
CEO tenure –0.04 (0.08) 0.01 (0.07)
Firm affiliated with a business group –0.02 (0.05) –0.09 (0.13)
Dual class shares 0.03 (0.04) 0.08 (0.08)
Inside ownership –0.06 (0.05) –0.02 (0.11)
Percentage ownership of largest owner 0.01 (0.03) –0.01 (0.08)
Sample of FFs include high–tech industriesa 0.02 (0.01) –0.21 (0.06)**
R2 0.25 0.48
K 312 158
Qmodel(p) 116.99 (0.00) 112.93 (0.00)
Qresidual(p) 361.87 (0.00) 124.05 (0.46)
V 0.00375 0.00233
Notes: Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses. k is the number of effect sizes; Q is the
homogeneity statistic with its probability in parentheses; and V is the random effects variance component.
a High-tech industries include the following: electronics and computers, pharmaceuticals, and air spacecraft.
† p , .10
*p , .05
**p , .01
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Moreover, family owners’ monitoring and their
efficacious deployment of internal and external
resources, which are part of the organizations’ re-
source orchestration (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007;
Sirmon et al., 2011), can be considered an im-
portant and useful dynamic capability of those
firms (Teece et al., 1997). The specific mechanisms
underlying the resource orchestration in family
firms challenge and extend prior knowledge on
innovation in organizations. First, while control
throughout the innovation process has often been
portrayed as detrimental to creativity and infor-
mation sharing (Simons, 1995), we argue that the
monitoring of family owners spurs the process,
since those owners are highly committed to the
firm, interested in an efficient conversion process,
and can be characterized as informed and sophis-
ticated owners who possess rich knowledge of the
firm, its products and services, and its environ-
ment. Second, we also draw attention to how
a focus on nonfinancial goals can entail competi-
tive advantages for firms, not only with regard to
superior reputation as identified by previous
studies (Zellweger, Eddleston, & Kellermanns,
2010), but also in relation to innovation. As we ar-
gue, in contrast to prior research that has mainly
focused on the private benefits that family owners
might extract from their organizations, to the det-
riment of these firms (e.g., Dyck & Zingales, 2004),
the pursuit of nonfinancial goals, and in particular
the desire to build and maintain long-lasting and
trusted relationships with firm-internal and -external
stakeholders, results in routines, tacit knowledge,
and superior network access that help spur the
conversion of innovation input into innovation
output.
Our findings, in particular the results on innova-
tion output in family firms with later-generation, as
opposed to first-generation, CEOs, show that those
dynamic capabilities cannot be acquired in the short
TABLE 5
Summary of Hypothesized Effects
Hypotheses Methodology Statistical results Interpretation
Baseline hypotheses
1a: Family firms have lower innovation input
compared to nonfamily firms.
MASEM Table 3a: 20.03 (p , 0.01) Hypothesis 1a supported
1b: Family firms have higher innovation output
compared to nonfamily firms.
MASEM Table 3a: 0.03 (p , 0.01) Hypothesis 1b supported
Corrected for lower input (see fna 12): 0.026
Leadership variables
2a: Family firms with a family CEO have even
lower innovation input than those without
a family CEO.
MASEM Table 3b: 20.04 (p , 0.01) Hypothesis 2a weakly
supported (co-efficient
morenegative yet difference
nonsignificant)
Table 3a vs. 3b:b z 5 21.17 (p , 0.24)
3a: Family firmswith founder CEO have higher
innovation input than those without
a founder CEO.
MASEM Table 3c: .06 (p , .01) Hypothesis 2b supported
Table 3a vs. 3c: z 5 2.75 (p , .01)
2b: Family firms with family CEOs have higher
innovation output than those without
a family CEO.
MASEM Table 3b: 0.09 (p , 0.01) Hypothesis 3a supported
Table 3a vs. 3b: z 5 10.21 (p , 0.01)
Corrected for lower input (see fn. 13): .084
3b: Family firms with founder CEOs have
higher innovation output than those without
a founder CEO.
MASEM Table 3c: 20.09 (p , 0.01) Hypothesis 3b rejected
(significant, but opposite
direction)
Table 3a vs. 3c: z 5243.71 (p , 0.01)
Corrected for higher input (see fn. 14):20.082
Country-level moderators—post hoc test
Increased minority shareholder protection MARA Table 4: 20.02 (p , 0.05) Even lower innovation input
in family firms, as effect
sizes more negative
Effect ofworkforcewith higher education in the
respective country
MARA Table 4: 1.54 (p , 0.05) Even higher innovation
output in family firms, as
effect sizes more positive
a fn. 5 footnote; for calculations of how to transform values controlling for innovation input into the overall effects on innovation output,
please refer to the respective footnotes in the results section.
b In order to test whether the presence of family CEOs or founder CEOs affects the baseline hypotheses, the coefficients derived from the
models referring to the baseline hypotheses (Table 3a) need to be compared with the coefficients derived from the models focusing on family
CEOs (Table 3b) or founder CEOs (Table 3c), respectively.
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term,but that they aredevelopedandbuilt upover an
extended period of time. As such, our study also
draws attention to the temporal perspective of firms’
competitive advantages with regard to innovation,
whichmight accumulate over time. In sum, findings
from our study not only offer important insights
for owners and managers of family firms, but also
for those of nonfamily firms that are encouraged
to learn from the efficient innovation processes of
family firms.
Indeed, the identified mechanisms that lead to su-
perior conversion rate and higher innovation output
in family firms are not “bloodline issues,” but are
caused by the characteristic governance structures
and goalswithin those firms.As such, they could also
be emulated in other blockholding arrangements,
such as pension funds (Hoskisson et al., 2002), trusts
(Thomsen & Pedersen, 1996), or state-ownership en-
terprises (Shleifer, 1998). In particular, dedicated (as
opposed to transient) owners (Connelly, Tihanyi,
Certo, & Hitt, 2010) might aim to learn from family
firms in terms of how to achieve “active ownership
involvement,” which includes the committed and
informedmonitoring of innovation processes, as well
as dedication to stakeholders.
Research on innovation in family firms. Our re-
search also attempts to reconcile and extend prior
findings on innovation in family firms, a topic that
is of substantial practical and scholarly interest
(De Massis et al., 2013). While our results confirm
prior empirical findings (e.g., Block, 2012; Chrisman
& Patel, 2012; Go´mez-Mejı´a et al., 2014; Schmid,
Achleitner, Ampenberger, & Kaserer, 2014) that
innovation input is lower in family firms than in
nonfamily firms, we challenge research on family
firm innovation by arguing and empirically showing
that this lower input level does not translate into
a loweroutput level; instead,our findings indicate that
family firms are particularly well suited to efficiently
using invested resources (e.g., Carney, 2005; Sirmon
et al., 2011)—and thus to achieving higher innovation
output—compared to nonfamily firms, despite the
formers’ limited level of innovation input.
We argue that both effects—lower innovation in-
put andhigher innovation output—are caused by the
same set of family firm idiosyncrasies. First, wealth
concentration implies specific attitudes toward risk
and uncertainty, and thus lowers the amount of fi-
nancial resources dedicated to innovation projects,
which are a priori uncertain; however, at the same
time it also motivates family owners to monitor the
efficiencyof the innovationprocess inorder to further
reduce uncertainty. Second, the family owners’ high
level of power and control over the firm renders them
able to enforce their personal investment preferences,
but also empowers them to efficaciously monitor the
innovation process. Third, the focus on nonfinancial
goals dis-incentivizes family owners to raise external
money, and thus limits their innovation input. At the
same time, the existence of nonfinancial, alongside
financial, goals, also leads to the development of ca-
pabilities, tacit knowledge, and network access over
time, which ultimately augment the innovation pro-
cess. Our study thus also informs scholarly discus-
sions on whether family influence is beneficial or
detrimental to firm success (O’Boyle et al., 2012;
Wagner, Block, Miller, Schwens, & Xi, 2015).
In addition to the empirical contribution and rec-
onciliation of prior results, the findings from our
study have important implications for theory on
family firm innovation. Given the complex nature of
firm-level innovation, building on arguments from
a single extant theory to explain family firm in-
novation is insufficient. For instance, the behavioral
agency model (Wiseman & Go´mez-Mejı´a, 1998) is
able to explain lower innovation input, yet it falls
short in explaining family firms’ innovation output.
The resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Carnes &
Ireland, 2013; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003), by contrast, cap-
tures family firms’ advantages in orchestrating re-
sources and in efficiently turning innovation input
into valuable output; however, it does not convinc-
ingly predict family firms’ lower innovation input. In
line with recent calls to build on multi-theory ap-
proaches to fully comprehend family business be-
havior (Miller et al., 2014), we argue that in order to
understand family firm innovation, one needs to take
one step back and consider the specific elements that
render family firms different from nonfamily firms;
these elements include the family’s level of control
over a firm, the concentration of the family’s wealth,
and the nonfinancial goals of family firm owners.
These factors, in turn, affect both the investment de-
cisions of a family firm (which are often explained by
behavioral agency models) and the conversion pro-
cess of innovation input into output in those firms
(which is often explained by resource orchestration).
Research on family firm heterogeneity. Our
findings also contribute to recent research on hetero-
geneity among family firms (Chuaet al., 2012), because
we find substantial variance within our sample that is
dependent on who the family firm’s CEO is. First, the
findings of our study have implications for research
on the advantages and disadvantages of leadership
professionalization (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Go´mez-
Mejı´a et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2014; Stewart & Hitt,
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2012) in family firms.Anongoingdebate in family firm
research aims to answer the question regarding
whether family CEOs are beneficial or detrimental to
firm performance. As some researchers have argued,
the emotional attachment of the family CEO will lead
to outstanding commitment (e.g., Sciascia & Mazzola,
2008). Other researchers, however, have argued that
family CEOs are often selected for altruistic and
nepotistic reasons, and that they thus underperform
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 2002). Our study
reveals that management by a family CEO further im-
pedes investment of resources in innovation, but si-
multaneously fosters efficiency in the use of those
resources. Our study thus indicates that firms with
a family CEO might benefit from the use of incentive
systems to foster investment in innovation, whereas
family firms with professionalized management—
i.e., a nonfamily CEO—should focus on creating and
maintaining valuable social and human capital within
the organization to become (and remain) innovative.
Second, our study challenges the emerging stream
of research aiming to disentangle founder effects
(Block, 2012; Block, Miller, Jaskiewicz, & Spiegel,
2011; Jayaraman et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2011).
Previous studies in this research stream have shown
that founder-led firms differ from other firms and
that they often outperform both nonfamily firms
and family firms that are controlled by later gener-
ations (Andres, 2008; Miller et al., 2007). Our data
confirm findings from prior studies showing that
founder firms have high levels of innovation input
(Block et al., 2011). Surprisingly, however, and
contrary to our conjecture, firmswith a founderCEO
exhibit lower levels of innovation output. We ex-
plain this initially unexpected finding by referring
to such firms’ inferior levels of efficient organiza-
tional routines, limited firm-internal tacit knowl-
edge, and less privileged network access relative to
later-generation family firms: as these family firm-
specific advantages build up over time (Sirmon &
Hitt, 2003), they might thus be less prevalent in
founder-led firms.16 Moreover, founder CEOsmight
suffer from potential over-investment in less promis-
ing innovation projects (cf. Nieß & Biemann, 2014),
since such leaders face “less resistance to investing in
poor projects” (Fahlenbrach, 2009: 462). The un-
expected finding of a negative impact of founder
presenceon innovationoutputmight stimulate further
in-depth research on the positive and negative effects
of founders on firm behavior and on the associated
competitive advantages and disadvantages. In partic-
ular, researchers might study how the innovation in-
put and output of founder-led firms change as the
tenure of the CEO increases.
Research on the relevance of institutional fac-
tors for innovation input and output. The results
from our post hoc analyses show that the focal re-
lationships also depend on country-level factors; in
other words, the innovative behavior of family and
nonfamily firms differs in their susceptibility to the
influence of institutions.
First, our results show that high levels of minority
shareholder protection (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998) strengthen the negative ef-
fect of family control on innovation input. As such,
our findings challenge extant research on the benefits
of shareholder protection (e.g., Djankov, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Several recent
law and economics studies might help explain this
initially puzzling effect (Anabtawi, 2005; Anabtawi &
Stout, 2008; Gordon, 2008). Belloc (2013) argued that
individual shareholders possess individual interests,
and, in particular, that they engage in intershar-
eholder opportunism strategies because they expect
ex post expropriation. High levels of minority share-
holder protection thereby provide individual share-
holders with powerful rights to block important
strategic moves and thus encourage defensive strate-
gies (Belloc, 2013). Individual minority shareholders
might therefore act as traders instead of owners
(Hendry, Sanderson, Barker, & Roberts, 2006), and
may focus on short-term financial performance
(Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000). Consequently, minor-
ity shareholder protection might impede, rather than
foster, innovation input in family firms.
Second, our results further extend research by
showing that not all organizations might equally
benefit from institutional factors. While innovation
scholars have long argued that organizations’ in-
novation output benefits from a highly educated
workforce in a country (Furman, Porter, & Stern, 2002;
Varsakelis, 2006), we show that this effect is even
stronger for family firms. We argue that this stronger
effect for family firms arises because of family firms’
pronounced reliance on the human capital of their
16 For instance, the level of trust that external network
partners place in the CEOmight be higher for family CEOs
than for founder CEOs. Research on trust has shown that
trust increases over time (Gulati, 1995). Since family CEOs,
who have often taken over responsibility from a family
member, are frequently introduced to the family firm’s
network early in their life (for instance, at important firm
celebrations or during internships), the network partners
of the family firm can, over time, build upmore substantial
trust in the family CEO than in a founder CEO.
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employees and the support of their network members
throughout the innovation process.
Limitations
As with any empirical work, this meta-analysis
faces a number of limitations. First, the effect sizes
presented in this study are onlymodest, yet they are
in line with the sizes of correlations reported in
other recent meta-analyses in the management lit-
erature (Carney et al., 2011; Dalton, Daily, Certo, &
Roengpitya, 2003; Post & Byron, 2015). Moreover,
even a seemingly trivial increase in innovation
output often translates into significant additional
earnings, given the positive link between innova-
tion output and firm performance (Capon, Farley, &
Hoenig, 1990; Rosenbusch, Brinckmann, & Bausch,
2011). This increase in innovation output matters
all the more given that family firms represent the
predominant type of firms across the globe.
As with any meta-analysis, our study is con-
strained by the limitations inherent in the primary
studies that we analyzed. As such, potential limi-
tations in the original study designs might distort
our findings. We aimed to mitigate the risk of such
biases by including a range of control variables
intended to identify the effects of potential mea-
surement,methodological, andmodel specification
artifacts into ourMARAs. For instance,we included
a dummy variable indicating whether the primary
studies controlled for endogeneity (no significant
effect). Moreover, in Appendix A, we provide an
overview of the research approach of the primary
studies (e.g., questionnaire vs. archival data) and
the response rates (if available).
Furthermore,meta-analytic studies often suffer from
a “file-drawer problem” (Rosenthal, 1979) caused by
overreliance on published work and a neglect of un-
published work. Since studies with nonsignificant
results often remain unpublished, such a bias would
imply that the results are, in reality, weaker than
suggested by the results of the meta-analysis. To
address this problem, we first aimed to include
unpublished work, such as working papers and un-
published theses. Second, we controlled for the jour-
nals’ impact factor in the MARA and included
a dummy variable indicating whether the study was
published. Third, we conducted robustness tests fo-
cusing solely on published papers in order to test
whether the results become stronger if unpublished
work remains unconsidered.17 Taken together, while
file-drawer problems cannot be entirely ruled out, the
robustness tests that we conducted indicate that our
results do not suffer from such biases, and provide
further empirical support for our hypotheses.
A further source of potential bias lies in the di-
versity of operationalizations used to capture the
effect of “family firms.” We aimed to address this
issue by creating four categories of family firms to
differentiate between various approaches to con-
ceptualizing family control, anduse those variables
as controls in the HOMA and MARA procedures.
However, potential differences among the primary
studies—for instance, in the minimum threshold
values for ownership shares—might still have af-
fected our findings. Future research is thus en-
couraged to investigate whether specific family
firm characteristics, besides the ones discussed in
this study, impact family firm innovation input
and output. We also encourage researchers to use
continuous measures of family control (Ko¨nig
et al., 2013), instead of a dichotomous distinction
between family and nonfamily firms, in further
studies.
Moreover, innovation input was typically oper-
ationalized as R&D expenditures standardized by
firm size. However, small and medium-sized busi-
nesses in particular frequently shy away from for-
mally budgeting resources for R&D purposes and
from reporting them as such; instead, employees
informally dedicate a substantial portion of their
work time to creating ideas for product and process
improvement.
In addition, the measures for innovation output are
less than perfect. For instance, scholars have criti-
cized theuseofpatentdataasavariable for innovation
output because patents may not transfer directly into
new product sales (Pakes & Griliches, 1980). More-
over, we could not differentiate between different
kinds of innovation activities. For instance, Ko¨nig
et al. (2013) argued that family firms face specific
dilemmas when discontinuous technologies occur,
and in the same vein, Patel and Chrisman (2014)
found that family firms invest less in exploration.
One may assume that family firms invest in con-
tinuous improvements in their core areas (Pennings
&Harianto, 1992; Sydow, Schreyo¨gg, &Koch, 2009),
and that they thereby become “innovators” and
experts in a rather narrow area (cf. Levitt & March,
1988). To gain an even better understanding of
family firm innovation, more research based on
a variety of nuanced innovation output variables,
in conjunction with the leadership variables dis-
cussed in this study, is needed.17 Details available from the authors upon request.
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Our study is further limited because it cannot cap-
ture all heterogeneity that exists among family firms.
Whilewe explicitly studied the effects of a family and
founder CEO,we could not study the potential effects
of, for instance, the variance of emphasis on different
nonfinancial goals of family owners (Kotlar & De
Massis, 2013), which have been shown to affect in-
novation in family firms (Kammerlander & Ganter,
2015). Further research might thus systematically
study the effect of further country-, firm-, and family-
level variables on the family firm–innovation input or
output relationships.
CONCLUSION
Family firms invest less in innovation projects
than do nonfamily firms. However, this finding does
not imply that family firms are less innovative than
nonfamily firms. The results from our meta-analysis
of 108 primary studies from 42 countries suggest that
family firms are particularly well-suited to deploy-
ing resources in an efficacious way and to turning
innovation input into innovation output. This effect
depends on the institutional context, and it is par-
ticularly strong when the CEO is from the family but
turns to the opposite when the founder remains the
CEO. These findings are relevant not only for family
firms, as the predominant type of firm around the
globe, but also our general understanding of in-
novation processes.
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APPENDIX B1
TABLE B1
HOMA Results
Pearson product–moment correlation (r)
Predictor k N Mean SE CI 95% Q test I2
Family firm to innovation inputa 214 135,167 –0.03* 0.01 20.04/–0.02 1,258.26 (0.00) 0.83
Family firm definition:
Ownership 79 52,030 –0.05* 0.01 20.07/–0.03 330.92 (0.00) 0.76
Management 86 51,049 20.01 0.01 20.03/0.02 707.18(0.00) 0.88
Ownership and management 19 13,900 –0.04* 0.02 20.07/–0.01 55.38 (0.00) 0.67
Ownership or management 30 18,188 20.03 0.02 20.06/0.01 147.35 (0.00) 0.80
Family role in firms:
Family CEO 27 15,261 20.04 0.02 20.09/0.01 231.27 (0.00) 0.89
Founder CEO 31 14,196 0.06† 0.03 20.00/0.11 342.89 (0.00) 0.91
Other family management roleb 28 21,592 –0.04* 0.01 20.07/–0.01 111.25 (0.00) 0.76
Family ownership 79 52,030 –0.05* 0.01 20.07/–0.03 330.92 (0.00) 0.76
Other ownership or management role 49 32,088 –0.03* 0.01 20.06/–0.01 210.16 (0.00) 0.77
Firm type:
Publicly listed family firms 190 113,019 –0.03* 0.01 20.04/–0.01 1,200.84 (0.00) 0.84
Private family firms 20 17,352 –0.03* 0.01 20.05/–0.01 29.94 (0.05) 0.30
Mixed 4 4,796 –0.06† 0.03 20.13/0.01 14.84 (0.00) 0.66
Notes: k5 number of effect sizes; n5 firm observations; SE5 the standard error of the mean correlation; CI 95%5 95 percent confidence
interval around the meta–analytic mean;Q test5Hedges and Olkin (1985) x2 test for homogeneity; and I25 scale-free index of heterogeneity.
a Innovation input variables include (1) R&D/sales, (2) R&D/assets, (3) R&D/total investment, (4) employees focused on R&D/total em-
ployees, (5) external expenses for R&D/sales, and (6) R&D/firm’s market value of equity.
b Other family role variables include family involvement in board of directors of the firm, professional CEO, and mixed management role.
*p , .05
† p , .10.
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APPENDIX B2
TABLE B2
HOMA Results
Pearson product–moment correlation (r) and Partial linear correlation coefficient (rxy.z)
Predictor K n Mean SE CI 95% Q test I2
Family firm to innovation inputa 312 238,176 –0.03* 0.00 20.04/–0.02 1,423.46 (0.00) 0.78
Family firm definition:
Ownership 139 123,389 –0.04* 0.01 20.05/–0.03 444.13 (0.00) 0.69
Management 117 69,176 20.01 0.01 20.03/0.01 726.06 (0.00) 0.84
Ownership and management 25 26,647 –0.03* 0.01 20.06/–0.01 94.47 (0.00) 0.75
Ownership or management 31 18,964 20.02 0.02 20.06/0.01 155.62 (0.00) 0.81
Family role in firms:
Family CEO 32 20,023 –0.04† 0.02 20.08/0.00 232.24 (0.00) 0.87
Founder CEO 48 22,154 0.03† 0.02 20.00/0.07 351.62 (0.00) 0.87
Other family management roleb 37 26,999 –0.04* 0.01 20.07/–0.02 116.44 (0.00) 0.69
Family ownership 139 123,389 –0.04* 0.01 20.05/–0.03 444.13 (0.00) 0.69
Other ownership or management role 56 45,611 –0.03* 0.01 20.05/–0.01 214.80 (0.00) 0.74
Firm type:
Publicly listed family firms 281 201,235 –0.03* 0.01 20.04/–0.02 1,331.13 (0.00) 0.79
Private family firms 24 22,062 –0.03* 0.01 20.05/–0.02 38.17 (0.02) 0.40
Mixed 7 14,879 20.02 0.03 20.07/0.03 50.23 (0.00) 0.88
Notes: k5 number of effect sizes; n5 firm observations; SE5 the standard error of the mean correlation; CI 95%5 95 percent confidence
interval around the meta-analytic mean;Q test5Hedges and Olkin (1985) x2 test for homogeneity; and I25 scale–free index of heterogeneity.
a Innovation input variables include (1) R&D/sales, (2) R&D/assets, (3) R&D/total investment, (4) employees focused on R&D/total em-
ployees, (5) external expenses for R&D/sales, and (6) R&D/Firm’s market value of equity.
b Other family role variables include family involvement in board of directors of the firm, professional CEO, and mixed management role.
*p , .05
† p , .10.
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APPENDIX C1
TABLE C1
HOMA Results
Pearson product–moment correlation (r)
Predictor K N Mean SE CI 95% Q test I2
Family firm to innovation outputa 37 17,423 0.01 0.02 20.03/0.04 125.30 (0.00) 0.71
Family firm definition:
Ownership 15 3,722 0.04 0.02 20.01/0.08 24.17 (0.04) 0.42
Management 14 9,932 20.01 0.02 20.06/0.04 53.66 (0.00) 0.76
Ownership and management 7 2,993 20.02 0.05 20.11/0.07 27.97 (0.00) 0.79
Ownership or management 1 776 0.04 — — — —
Family role in firms:
Family CEO 4 2,399 0.07* 0.03 0.01/0.13 6.48 (0.09) 0.54
Founder CEO 5 1,211 –0.10† 0.05 20.20/0.01 13.61 (0.01) 0.71
Other family management roleb 5 6,322 20.01 0.02 20.05/0.04 8.45 (0.08) 0.53
Family ownership 15 3,722 0.04 0.02 20.01/0.08 24.17 (0.04) 0.42
Other ownership or management role 8 3,769 20.01 0.04 20.09/0.07 34.20 (0.00) 0.80
Firm type:
Publicly listed family firms 13 6,740 0.01 0.02 20.04/0.05 36.70 (0.00) 0.67
Private family firms 21 9,525 0.01 0.03 20.04/0.06 85.93 (0.00) 0.77
Mixed 3 1,158 20.02 0.03 20.08/0.03 0.80 (0.67) 0.00
Notes: k5 number of effect sizes; n5 firm observations; SE5 the standard error of the mean correlation; CI 95%5 95 percent confidence
interval around the meta-analytic mean;Q test5Hedges and Olkin (1985) x2 test for homogeneity; and I25 scale–free index of heterogeneity.
a Innovation output variables include (1) number of patents, (2) number of patents/R&D investment, (3) patent citations, (4) patent citations/
R&D investment, (5) percentage of sales consisted on new products/services introduced, and (6) innovation introduction.
b Other family role variables include family involvement in board of directors of the firm, professional CEO, and mixed management role.
*p , .05
† p , .10.
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APPENDIX C2
TABLE C2
HOMA Results
Pearson product–moment correlation (r) and Partial linear correlation coefficient (rxy.z)
Predictor K n Mean SE CI 95% Q test I2
Family firm to innovation outputa 158 63,262 20.00 0.01 20.02/0.01 465.51 (0.00) 0.66
Family firm definition:
Ownership 46 19,831 0.03* 0.01 0.00/0.05 92.19 (0.00) 0.51
Management 95 37,966 20.01 0.01 20.03/0.01 313.80 (0.00) 0.70
Ownership and management 7 2,993 20.02 0.05 20.11/0.07 27.97 (0.00) 0.79
Ownership or management 10 2,472 0.03 0.02 20.01/0.07 0.30 (1.00) 0.00
Family role in firms:
Family CEO 21 8,371 0.03* 0.01 0.01/0.06 30.71 (0.06) 0.35
Founder CEO 42 8,161 –0.05* 0.02 20.08/–0.01 100.59 (0.00) 0.59
Other family management roleb 32 21,434 0.00 0.02 20.03/0.04 136.61 (0.00) 0.77
Family ownership 46 19,831 0.03* 0.01 0.00/0.05 92.19 (0.00) 0.51
Other ownership or management role 17 5,465 0.00 0.02 20.05/0.05 39.56 (0.00) 0.60
Firm type:
Publicly listed family firms 102 31,278 20.01 0.01 20.03/0.01 193.00 (0.00) 0.48
Private family firms 53 30,826 0.03† 0.01 20.00/0.05 271.56 (0.00) 0.81
Mixed 3 1,158 20.02 0.03 20.08/0.03 0.80 (0.67) 0.00
Notes: k5 number of effect sizes; n5 firm observations; SE5 the standard error of the mean correlation; CI 95%5 95 percent confidence
interval around the meta-analytic mean;Q test5Hedges and Olkin (1985) x2 test for homogeneity; and I25 scale–free index of heterogeneity.
a Innovation output variables include (1) number of patents, (2) number of patents/R&D investment, (3) patent citations, (4) patent citations/
R&D investment, (5) percentage of sales consisted on new products/services introduced, and (6) innovation introduction.
b Other family role variables include family involvement in board of directors of the firm, professional CEO, and mixed management role.
*p , .05
† p , .10.
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